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Abstract
Clinicians are required to act in the best interest of
neonates. However, it is not obvious that entry into a
randomised controlled trial (RCT) is in a neonate’s
best interest because such trials often involve additional
onerous procedures (such as intramuscular injections)
in return for which the neonate receives unproven
treatment or a placebo. On the other hand, neonatology
needs to develop its evidence base, and RCTs are
central to this task. The solution posited here is based
on two points. First, “best interest” is not equivalent to
“the best possible interest” only to “best interest within
a certain realm”. The realm of deliberation when
asking the title question is the neonate’s health.
Deliberating in this realm may involve the exclusion
from consideration of some factors that might be
thought relevant (such as parental wealth).
Furthermore, circumstances may dictate the need to
deliberate on other factors that might be thought
irrelevant (such as health care resources). Second,
deciding on a neonate’s best interest does not involve
“putting oneself in its shoes”. Rather, it involves asking
in what it has an interest, or stake. These will include
some things in which we all, as human beings, have a
stake, such as medical progress. Putting these two
points together, in the realm of health the answer to
whether RCT entry is in a neonate’s best interest is
usually very finely balanced.Where this is the case, it
is reasonable to invoke a broader notion of best interest
and include a broader range of elements in which the
neonate has a stake, including medical progress. In this
way RCT entry can, usually, be said to be in a
neonate’s best interest.
(Journal of Medical Ethics 2001;27:110–113)
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Introduction
This paper arose from discussions held at three
colloquia under the auspices of “Euricon”, a Euro-
pean Union funded project looking at informed
consent to neonatal research trials. The aim of this
paper is to show why the title question is of
importance, why there is a problem, to analyse the
term “best interest” and, finally, to suggest a possi-
ble answer based on a view of burdens, benefits and
interests suggested by Feinberg.1 The paper is only
concerned with research of direct benefit (so called,
“therapeutic research”).
Much of the discussion in this paper will be rel-
evant to other areas of medicine, especially those
concerned with incompetent patients.However, the
focus on neonates could be justified in two ways.
First, the need for research in neonatology seems
particularly acute, being a relatively young disci-
pline in which many of the treatments used are
often only licensed for use in adults. Second,
neonates raise the issue of best interest in a particu-
larly pure form. There is no possibility that one can
use a form of substituted judgment on the basis of
the neonate’s earlier preferences (something that
can be done with some mentally ill adults). Neither
may one foster a neonate’s inchoate autonomy (as
one may do with an older child).
Why does the question matter?
A “best interest principle” governs the conduct of
parents and clinicians with regard to neonates
receiving health care.2 Parents have the power of
proxy consent but must use it only in their child’s
best interest.3 Clinicians are required to act in the
best interest of incompetent patients4 (such as
neonates) and of all patients (with the proviso that
competent patients have given consent). Regarding
research, the position in UK law appears to be that
parents may consent to research of direct benefit on
their neonate (only) if they are satisfied it is in its
best interest, the same principle that governs
consent to treatment.5
It might be argued that therapeutic RCTs have a
therapeutic aim, that as well as testing a new treat-
ment, the new treatment is being given with the
hope of benefit for the neonate, and that therefore,
it is in the best interest of the neonate to be entered
into such research. However, this line of argument
is problematic for at least two reasons. First, the
new treatment given as part of the RCT might not
benefit the neonate, either because it has no eVect
or because it has deleterious eVects that outweigh
any benefit. If this wasn’t a possibility then the RCT
would be unnecessary. Thus, whilst we can say to
parents of neonates receiving standard treatment
that, on balance, the treatment is likely to benefit
their child, we cannot say this with certainty to par-
ents whose neonates are receiving new treatment
within a trial. Second, as well as not benefiting the
neonate, the new treatment might involve some
burdens, such as additional and onerous interven-
tions or some additional risk. Consider the follow-
ing three simplified examples of RCTs.
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RCT 1. There is a condition aVecting neonates
for which there is a standard treatment (A) and a
new treatment (B) on which there have been phase
I and II trials that suggest it may improve on A. B is
in the form of a regular intramuscular injection
given in addition to A. A placebo controlled RCT is
begun. B is only available through this RCT. Is it in
the neonate’s best interest to be entered into this
trial? It would seem not. Any neonate entered
stands a 50% chance of being burdened with a set
of ineVective, placebo injections and a 50% chance
of being burdened with a set of injections which
may be beneficial, ineVective or deleterious. As
such, we cannot say that, on balance, these
injections are likely to help the neonate.
RCT 2. If we imagine that the trial is not placebo
controlled, being instead a straight comparison of A
with A plus B, then a neonate stands a 50% chance
of receiving exactly the same treatment as outside
the trial and a 50% chance of receiving the burden
(of intramuscular injections) in return for a
treatment about whose eYcacy in relation to estab-
lished treatment we are unsure. Thus, again, it
looks marginally against the neonate’s best interest
to be entered into the trial.
RCT 3. Lastly, imagine a trial which has minimal
burdens. In such a case the neonate stands a 50/50
chance of receiving a treatment about whose
eYcacy we are unsure but without additional risk or
other burden. An example of such an RCT might
be one comparing two baby milk feeds for the pre-
term infant, where the mother and researcher are
blinded to the allocation. An outcome measure of
growth and development at two years would look at
diVerences between the two. There would seem to
be very little additional burden to the parents or the
child. This form of trial has been done many times.
Here the neonate seems to be as well oV inside as
outside the trial. Trial entry may plausibly be said
to be in its best interest, it being one of two “best
options” (ie standard treatment and treatment
within the trial). It is not unreasonable to use the
phrase, “Either of these two options would be
best”.
In summary, the problem is that many RCTs (ie
those with any burdens) appear, on the face of it, to
be contrary to a neonate’s best interest. Yet, it is
almost universally acknowledged that:
“Evidence based medicine is crucial for the
eVective management of patients. New-born babies
and infants do not deserve to be treated on the basis
of poorer quality evidence compared to older chil-
dren and adults.”6
And RCTs play a central role in evidence based
medicine. Let us turn, then, to an analysis of the
term “best interest”.
Best interest
The term “best interest” is most often used in legal
and quasi-legal discussions (such as at case confer-
ences) of the treatment of incompetent patients.
Occasionally it may be invoked to discuss overrid-
ing the autonomy of competent patients (such as
denying the full facts of diagnosis to seriously ill
patients).7 Kopelman suggests there are three main
uses of the term.8 The one that concerns us is its use
as a marker for beneficence, the health carers’
prima facie duty maximally to promote the good of
the individual.9 It is this duty that underlies most
health care interventions. Discussion of best
interest in this form occurs most often where there
is doubt as to what will promote the good of an
incompetent individual (given that competent indi-
viduals are deemed capable of deciding for
themselves). Such discussions occur in court where
the doubt coincides with very serious consequences
for the incompetent patient, as in cases where it is
felt that it could be in someone’s best interest to
have life-saving treatment halted or not begun.10
Two points can be made about such discussions.
i) First, consideration of best interest may be
limited to a certain realm of the child’s life, for
example, to his or her family relationships. As a
result, certain factors that could be thought rel-
evant to the child’s overall good may be
excluded. For example, in a custody case one
would only consider whether the child is best
placed with either mother or father, excluding
consideration of whether she would be best
placed somewhere else entirely. In the type of
case we are considering the realm may be very
broad. A clinician trying to decide what is in the
best interest of a seriously handicapped neonate
may need to include almost every aspect of that
child’s life and future. Certainly where such con-
sideration of best interest occurs in court, as in
cases involving discussion of the withdrawal or
withholding of treatment from severely handi-
capped neonates, a very broad range of factors
are included.11
However, perhaps not everything is relevant. For
example, it may be thought wrong to include the
relative prosperity of the parents in the delibera-
tion, such that, of two identically handicapped
neonates, the one with rich parents lives, the one
with poor parents dies.12 The realm of the
clinician’s best interest deliberation is probably
best described as being the neonate’s health,
something that is very broad but not all encom-
passing.
ii) Second, and on the other hand, consideration of
a child’s best interest seems to involve delibera-
tion on factors other than those which can real-
istically be said to promote maximally the good
health of the child. Resources are an obvious
example; we may decide we cannot aVord to
give a child a remote chance of life because the
treatment is too expensive. Parental wishes are
another example. We might desist from doing
something we think best for a child because par-
ents do not consent to it.13 Thus, acting in a
child’s best interest is not necessarily doing what
is ideal, only what is best in the circumstances. It
does not follow that, say, when we consider
whether we can aVord a treatment for a child we
are deliberating on its best interest. Rather, it
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means that prior to deliberation on its best
interest we need to know the relevant circum-
stances.
It follows from these two points (i and ii) that
deciding whether or not entry into RCTs is in a
neonate’s best interest will involve consideration of
our realm of deliberation. Let us now turn to that
task.
Is RCT entry in a neonate’s best interest?
Feinberg oVers a way of looking at burdens and
benefits that may be helpful.14 For Feinberg a bur-
den (or “harm”) is something that frustrates,
defeats or sets back our interests (and vice versa a
benefit, presumably). An interest is something in
which we have a stake, that is, we stand to lose or
gain depending upon what happens to it. What is
important here is that having an interest in
something does not require being interested in it.
For example, it will be contrary to a neonate’s
interest to be sterilised by a treatment even though
the neonate doesn’t himself care.15 Having an inter-
est does not even require that one be conscious or
self-conscious. All living organisms have interests.
A dog has an interest in eating unpoisoned food. A
tree has an interest in receiving enough water and is
harmed by a drought. Roughly, the interests of all
living things are what they require in order to live
well (as dog, tree or whatever). These interests will
diVer because a good life for a dog is diVerent from
a good life for a tree, similarly for a human.
On this account, deciding someone’s best
interest is not a matter of putting oneself in anoth-
er’s shoes and thinking what they would like, rather
it is looking at the type of being the other is (ie a
human being) and at the sort of things in which
human beings have a stake (such as health and a
good life). In this sense, the range of things in which
neonates have a stake will be as broad as the range
in which we all have a stake. This will mean not just
absence of pain, but freedom from handicap, the
development (and eventual use) of potentials to
reason and of physical potentials, living in a peace-
ful and flourishing society, in fact, everything
required to live a good human life. Included in this
list will be the progress of science and medicine as
this is something in which we all, as humans, have a
stake.
If this is correct then we can say that the neonate
has a stake in being entered in a RCT, that stake
being the progress of medicine. How would having
such a stake aVect our attitude to whether or not
RCT entry is in the particular neonate’s best inter-
est? We have already noted that the realm of
consideration when we use the term “best interest”
in this context is the neonate’s health. Surely it is
stretching credulity to suggest that the generic
progress of medicine is an aspect of a neonate’s
health.
Whilst this seems correct, two points may coun-
terbalance it. First, where we are deliberating
between which of two options is in a neonate’s best
interest in terms of its health and find the point
finely balanced, it seems reasonable to bring in
other aspects of its life, to take a more global view of
its best interest. Hence, if we cannot choose, on the
basis of the neonate’s health, between entry and
non-entry to a RCT, the fact that the neonate, like
all of us, has a stake in medical progress may swing
the argument in favour of entry. Second, we have
noted that other factors, such as resources, are rel-
evant to our deliberation. Perhaps consideration of
the progress of medicine (subsumed under the
principle of justice) may swing us in favour of RCT
entry where the balance between beneficence and
non-maleficence alone does not suggest it.
In the three examples of RCTs above (RCT 1, 2
and 3) it is obvious that RCT 3 is very finely
balanced indeed, hence it seems reasonable to
include the neonate’s stake in medical progress and
conclude that RCT entry is in its best interest pro-
vided that other conditions are met, particularly,
that there is parental consent. This is less clear with
RCTs 1 and 2.With RCT 2 the balance also seems
fairly fine; whilst half of the trial entrants will
receive additional burdens there is some hope of
benefit in return. And usually clinical equipoise will
set the chance of benefit versus no benefit or
deleterious eVect at greater than 50/50 (for
example, on the basis of previous trials, phase I and
II trials, or of plausible biological mechanisms).16
Thus, again, the global view of things in which the
neonate has a stake may tip the balance in favour of
saying that RCT entry is in its best interest.
Most diYcult case
RCT 1 (in which the neonate may receive standard
treatment plus placebo) presents the most diYcult
case. Can we say that it is finely balanced enough
for global considerations to come into play when up
to 50% of trial entrants are being exposed (for
reasons of scientific rigour) to a burden in return
for no possible health benefit, a placebo eVect being
very unlikely in a neonate? (NB: This does not
imply that placebos should not be used in neonatal
research.) Presumably it will depend on the burden
and the view one takes of it. In many RCT 1 type
trials the placebo will not be a great burden, for
example, it may be an inert substance given
through a pre-existing intravenous line. In such a
case the health burdens and benefits do look finely
balanced. As such, the global view of things again
may tip the balance of the neonate’s interest in
favour of trial entry.17
With RCT 1 itself the placebo is given intramus-
cularly, something painful for the neonate, although
usually this will not pose any more than minimal
risk (for example, risk of death less than one per
million, risk of major complication less than ten per
million18). Consideration of the pain alone, how-
ever, may be enough for us to say, in health terms,
that trial entry is not in the neonate’s best interest
and that, therefore, we should not go onto the next
stage of bringing in global considerations to tip the
balance in favour of entry. An alternative view
might be that the pain involved is insignificant and
that, therefore, the RCT entry versus non-entry
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options are finely balanced in terms of the neonate’s
(health) best interest. The frequency and duration
of the intramuscular placebo injections may be
important. The problem may be reduced in various
ways. First, an alternative non-placebo trial design
may be used. Second, the placebo could be given as
a fake, intramuscular injection, where no needle
actually penetrates the skin, although the rest of the
ritual is followed (for example, by placing a small
plaster over the “injection site”). Third, anaesthetic
cream might be applied prior to the injection. Any
of these measures could make the health best inter-
est considerations finely balanced and allow us to
invoke the global considerations. A further, wider,
consideration should perhaps be the trial organis-
ation and the need for assurance of stringent safety
monitoring being in place, such as a data monitor-
ing and steering committees with a remit for trial
safety, (as set out in the current Medical Research
Council [MRC] guidelines for good clinical
practice in clinical trials).19
Conclusion
So, is entry into therapeutic RCTs in the best inter-
est of a neonate? It seems that, in terms of the
neonate’s health alone, the answer is finely
balanced, but that when we invoke more global
considerations of best interest, the answer is,
usually, yes. Of these global considerations, the key
one is the neonate’s stake in the progress of
medicine. However, invoking this consideration
does not imply that it is reasonable to impose great
burdens in terms of risk or suVering on the neonate
for the sake of medicine.
“In research on man, the interest of science and
society should never take precedence over consid-
erations related to the well-being of the subject.”20
What it does imply is that, where the balance
between burdens and benefits in health terms is
finely balanced between RCT entry and non-entry,
it is reasonable to consider the neonate’s stake in
medical progress and, subject to parental consent,
deem trial entry to be in its best interest.
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